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In this paper, we analyze two questions. First, how do otherwise
similar people in four countries—Britain, Germany, the Netherlands,
and Sweden—end up in four different employment states: 1) full-time
with a regular contract, 2) part-time with a regular contract, 3) fixed-
term contract, either full-time or part-time, and 4) self-employed? Sec-
ond, how do wages differ between otherwise similar people in these
different work arrangements in each of the four countries? Our analysis
is carried out using the 1998 wave of four household panel data sets:
namely, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (Taylor 1992);
the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) (Wagner, Schupp, and
Rendtel 1991); the Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonder-
zoek (OSA) in the Netherlands (Allaart et al. 1987); and the HushDllens
Ekonomiska Levnadsf`rhDllanden (HUS) in Sweden (Flood, Klev-
marken, and Olovsson 1993; Klevmarken and Olovsson 1993).
Because we are specifically interested in the effects of policy on
employment choices and opportunities across the four countries, we
begin by focusing on policies that may result in different choices for
otherwise similar people. We focus especially on the Netherlands and
to some extent Sweden. We make use of other chapters of this volume,
particularly those of Fagan and Ward and of Schömann and Schömann.
In our empirical analysis, the Netherlands is the reference country,
which corresponds with the more detailed policy analysis for this coun-
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try. To compare otherwise similar people across countries, we use
demographic variables, such as gender, age, whether a person has
young children, and childrens’ ages. Further, we use information on the
person's education and his or her industry and occupation. The analyses
are carried out separately for men and women because the distribution
of employment across standard and nonstandard work is very gen-
dered. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In section two, we posi-
tion the four countries within a European perspective. The four coun-
tries have the highest percentage of part-time workers (i.e., fewer than
35 hours per week) among European Union (EU) countries. Fixed-term
work is not as common in these four countries as is part-time work.
The percentage of fixed-term workers among those employed in Swe-
den, the Netherlands, and Germany ranks in the middle, with Britain at
the lower end.
Section three compares recent policy on balancing worker rights
and introducing flexibility into the labor market in the four countries.
We focus particularly on measures that may explain different outcomes
for the employment distribution across standard and nonstandard work
for otherwise similar people. 
Section four traces policy in the Netherlands that has transformed
part-time work from an inferior position to a general right to shorten or
lengthen work hours in any job. Among the four countries, the Nether-
lands has come closest to the intentions of the EU’s so-called Part-
Time Directive of 1997, with Sweden and Germany following, and
Britain the farthest from meeting the directive.
Section five discusses legislation on self-employment in the coun-
tries under review. Section six discusses our microdata and presents
descriptive statistics on nonstandard work by gender. In section seven,
we discuss results from our multinomial logit models and wage regres-
sions, interpreting the results in light of policy differences and evi-
dence from other chapters in this volume. Section eight offers
conclusions.
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NONSTANDARD WORK IN BRITAIN, GERMANY, 
THE NETHERLANDS, AND SWEDEN IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
There is a simple reason that we examine these four countries:
between us, we have accumulated knowledge about institutions and
labor markets in our own countries (Gustafsson in Sweden, and Wet-
zels in the Netherlands), we have knowledge of languages involved,
and we have done prior work using the household panel data sets
involved (see, e.g., Gustafsson et al. 1996; Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and
Wetzels 2001a,b; Gustafsson and Wetzels 2000; Wetzels 2001). The
countries involved in this study do not fall at the extremes on a scale of
the importance of nonstandard work in the labor market, and they dif-
fer sufficiently from each other in an international comparison of the
nonstandard work dimensions studied in this chapter. 
Fagan and Ward (in this volume) present data on the percentage of
part-time workers among employed men and women in the 15 EU
member states (EU-15). The Netherlands ranks first, followed by Brit-
ain, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany. One could even claim that it is
debatable to call part-time work “nonstandard” work in the Nether-
lands, where 69 percent of employed women work part-time (Fagan
and Ward, Table 3.3, in this volume). Although Germany ranks fifth in
percentage of part-time workers among the EU-15, only a little more
than one-third of German women (36.4 percent) work part-time com-
pared with two-thirds of women in the Netherlands. Fagan and Ward
also show that, since 1985, the proportion of part-time employment
among women in the Netherlands and Germany has risen, while in
Britain, the proportion remained steady, and in Sweden, the proportion
declined. A decreasing proportion of part-time female workers is also
observed in the United States (Houseman and Osawa, in this volume)
and in Denmark (Hoffman and Walwei, in this volume). Although
part-time work among men is much less common than among women,
the Netherlands, Sweden, and Britain still rank first, third, and fourth,
respectively. In the Netherlands, 18 percent of men are considered
part-time workers; in Sweden and Britain, 9 percent of men work part-
time. Only Denmark, ranked second, has more men working part-time
than these countries. Germany, in contrast, has relatively little part-
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time work among men (4.7 percent) and ranks eighth among the 15 EU
member states.1
For fixed-term contract work, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ger-
many rank more in the middle among EU member states. Britain is
ranked 12th for men, with 6 percent of employed men working under a
fixed-term contract, and 13th for women, with 8 percent working under
a fixed-term contract. In the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany, the
percentage on fixed-term contract ranges between 12 percent and 16
percent for women and between 10 percent and 12 percent for men.
Fagan and Ward report that an employer in Britain has no reason to
offer a fixed-term contract of less than a year because all employment-
related benefits require more than 12 months employment with one
firm. For shorter periods of employment, the employer has exclusive
right to hire and fire, similar to the “employment-at-will” doctrine of
the United States. Labor markets in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ger-
many are much more regulated to protect workers’ rights. Schömann
and Schömann (in this volume) characterize EU member states by the
degree of legislation covering nonstandard work. Countries with the
most legislation include France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Countries
with less restrictive regulation include Denmark, Sweden, and the
Netherlands, whereas Britain has hardly any regulations at all.
Fagan and Ward (in this volume) also present figures on the per-
centage of employed persons in temporary agency work within 11 EU
member states. In 1997, 2.5 percent of employed people in the Nether-
lands were performing temporary agency work, and in Britain, 1 per-
cent were. The Netherlands ranks second after Luxembourg, and
Britain ranks fifth in the percentage of workers in temporary jobs. Ger-
many and Sweden have relatively few workers in temporary agency
work: 0.6 percent in Germany and 0.4 percent in Sweden, which places
these two countries at rank 8 and 9, respectively, out of 11. 
FLEXIBILITY OF THE LABOR MARKET AND PROTECTION 
OF WORKERS
The growth of nonstandard work arrangements can be seen as a
response to firms’ demands for a flexible labor force to meet customer
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demands and “just in time” production. A flexible labor force is often
in conflict with workers’ justified wishes to have a stable and secure
income. Various rules that condition employers’ rights to deviate from
the general rule that an employment contract is full-time and of indefi-
nite length have been introduced in European countries. Generally,
there have been periods of increasing regulations in the 1970s and
1980s, followed by periods of deregulation in the 1990s. Britain devi-
ates from this pattern in that there was regulation in the 1970s, deregu-
lation under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, and some reregulation
during the Tony Blair government beginning in 1997. The 1980s were
characterized by slow economic growth and high unemployment rates
in most of the EU-15 countries, whereas the United States experienced
employment and economic growth. Various observers ascribed the
high European unemployment rates to the regulated labor markets.
Blank and Freeman (1994) in a volume devoted to the question of
whether there is a trade-off between economic flexibility and regula-
tions in the labor market, find no clear case that protection of workers
necessarily leads to a less flexible labor market. It depends to a very
large extent on how worker protection is organized. 
European Union countries have deregulated their labor markets in
the 1990s to different extents and with different effects on job protec-
tion rights of workers. The Netherlands can be described as a “happy
deregulator.” Introducing flexibility into the labor market is seen as
one of the important steps, together with wage restraint and a decreas-
ing government sector, that turned the situation from the “Dutch Dis-
ease” to the “Dutch Miracle” (Hartog 1998; Visser and Hemerijck
1997). After the 1973 oil crisis, the “golden era” of strong economic
growth and low unemployment ended and was followed by a period
with double-digit unemployment and low economic growth (Hartog
1998). The labor unions in the Netherlands were defensive and pro-
moted work-sharing as a remedy for unemployment. Early retirement
and propaganda to keep women at home as full-time housewives were
used to decrease labor supply. In 1982, the Wassenaar Agreement was
concluded on a national level between employers and union represen-
tatives. In retrospect, this agreement was the turning point for the
Dutch economy. A key feature of the agreement was that unions agreed
to lower wage demands in exchange for shorter work weeks.
220 Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels
Tijdens (1998) observed that, in the Netherlands, flexibility in the
labor market has been internal; firms have gained increased rights to
use their regular labor force during times of increased demand for labor
without having to pay overtime premiums. Such a bargaining agree-
ment was attractive for the unions because it was accompanied by a
shorter regular full-time work week. Van den Toren (1998) observed
that half of those whose work conditions are determined by collective
bargaining agreements have a 36-hour work week. About 30 percent of
employed persons are members of a union in the Netherlands, and col-
lective bargaining agreements regulate working conditions for 80 to 90
percent of the Dutch labor force. This comes through the “erga omnes”
clauses, which stipulate that a bargaining agreement for an industry is
extended to nonmembers working in the same industry.
Although there is extensive job protection, flexible work increased
beginning in the early 1990s in the Netherlands. Temporary help agen-
cies are a big business, and Dutch agencies such as the Randstad have
become multinationals. Randstad is market leader in the Netherlands,
Belgium, Germany, and in the southeast United States. At the end of
1992, Randstad employed 6,450 individuals in the Netherlands, 1,400
in Germany, and 259 in Britain. In the same year, Randstad staffed
117,000 people in the Netherlands, 16,000 in Germany, and 3,500 in
Britain (Randstad 2001). 
Temporary help agencies sell flexible labor to the user companies,
but they are obliged to offer job security to their employees, according
to the Flexicurity Act of January 1999. When a temporary agency
worker has been employed for 18 months with one user company, or
36 months for several user companies, he or she receives a permanent
contract with the agency. Workers with fewer than 18 (or 36) months
also receive job protection; during the first 26 weeks of a temporary
contract (phase 1), there is no special regulation, but in the following
six months (phase 2), the temporary agency worker begins accumulat-
ing pension benefits and receives career advice. After 26 weeks, the
temporary agency worker receives a renewable three-month contract
until the 18 months or 36 months condition is fulfilled (Van den Toren,
Evers, and Commissaris 2002). There is a special union for temporary
agency workers as well. Thus, temporary agency workers in the Neth-
erlands often have regular contracts, which differs from the situation in
Britain (Fagan and Ward in this volume). Also on-call workers are cov-
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ered by the Flexicurity Act. However, if the firm has collective labor
agreements of its own, the on-call worker is covered by that agreement,
which might differ from the Flexicurity Act (Van den Toren, Evers,
and Commissaris 2002).
Hartog (1998) cites a study that shows that, in the early 1990s,
about 25 percent of temporary agency workers preferred temporary
work because they were students working during holidays, and another
25 percent preferred such work because it gave them, for example, the
opportunity to work in new environments. The other 50 percent of tem-
porary agency workers were looking for a permanent job. Firms hired
temporary workers for specific fixed-term tasks (44 percent), as substi-
tutes for personnel on leave (31 percent), and as a way to screen work-
ers (16 percent).
By the mid 1990s, the Netherlands was a booming economy with
stable employment growth, while Sweden and Germany were in deep
depressions, with substantial employment losses in Sweden and practi-
cally no job growth in Germany. Foreign observers traveled to the
Netherlands to admire the Dutch Miracle (Visser and Hemerijck 1997).
This Dutch Miracle had occurred with the introduction of substantial
flexibility into the labor force. The volume of full-time regular jobs in
1996 was the same as in 1970—about 3.7 million people—and the
steady job growth in the early 1990s consisted entirely of part-time
jobs, which amounted to 1.8 million in 1996, and flexible jobs
amounted to 0.7 million in 1996 (Hartog 1998).
If the Netherlands can be characterized as a “happy deregulator” in
the 1990s, Sweden can be characterized as a reluctant deregulator. Pri-
vate job mediation firms were allowed in Sweden and in Germany in
1993, which was only two years after the state monopoly in job media-
tion was officially lifted in the Netherlands. However, in Sweden in the
1990s, demands by firms for more flexibility came during an economic
depression with employment losses. It was not until 1998–1999 that
Sweden experienced an economic boom, with renewed employment
growth. The 1974 Employment Protection Act in effect prohibited hir-
ing on a fixed-term basis. Because fixed-term employment contracts
had already existed for seasonal jobs and jobs to complete a certain
task, it became immediately necessary to make exceptions to the rule.
Employers are allowed to employ workers on a fixed-term basis for
certain reasons, including 1) seasonal work, 2) work to perform one
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well-defined task, 3) to substitute for someone who is on leave, 4) to
augment the workforce if there are temporary increases in the work-
load, or 5) to employ students during summer breaks (SOU 1999).
Beginning in 1997, a new form of temporary employment was
introduced, called Temporary Employment for an Agreed Period.
Under this agreement, restrictions on reasons for the temporary
employment were relaxed. A person could only be hired for a fixed-
term contract for a maximum of 12 months over three years. Other-
wise, the contract became a regular one. Also, employers could place
new employees under a probation period of six months. 
The discussions of changes in the 1974 Employment Protection
Act have aroused strong political opposition. Flexibility was intro-
duced in January 1994 by the Carl Bildt coalition government (1991–
1994). In 1994, the social democratic Göran Persson government came
into power and “restored” the rules of probation and “temporary
employment.” The extension to 12 months by the Bildt government
was thus cut back again to six months by the Persson government.
In Germany, an employment contract is meant to be of indefinite
length. However, since 1985, the Employment Promotion Act viewed
the fixed-term contract as an instrument to reduce unemployment, and
was meant to temporarily relax the demands on firms to specifically
justify the use of fixed-term contracts. This act has been extended
twice and is valid until the end of 2000. As of 1996, employment last-
ing fewer than 24 months need not to be justified explicitly (Hoffman
and Walwei, in this volume). Further, for people over age 60, there is
no time limit on the length of fixed-term contracts.
In Britain, firms have no incentive to offer fixed-term contracts of
durations less than one year because employment benefits only apply
to workers who have been employed for 12 months at a firm (Fagan
and Ward in this volume). British legislation does not view the
arrangement as an employment contract; rather, the role of the agency
is more that of a labor market mediator. Therefore, British employment
data may include those who work for durations less than a year but do
not classify their contract as a fixed-term contract. Fagan and Ward
observe that Britain remains a neoliberal welfare state and does not
guarantee pay for temporary agency workers. The agency is not
responsible for how its client, the “user firm,” treats the worker. 
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THE CHANGING STATUS OF PART-TIME WORK 
The Netherlands has been called “the first part-time economy in
the world” (Visser 1999). With 39 percent of its workforce in part-time
jobs, the Netherlands ranks first among the EU-15 before Britain, Swe-
den, and Denmark, with 22 to 25 percent of their workforces in part-
time work. Visser (1999) also asked, Does it work? His answer: yes.
Not only is the Netherlands a happy deregulator, but also a happy part-
time economy. The 1997 European Union Directive on Part-Time
Work states: “Member states and social partners should identify and
review obstacles which may limit the opportunities for part-time work”
(EU 1998, p. 14). Furthermore, “employers should give consideration
to requests by workers to transfer from full-time to part-time work and
the reverse when such work becomes available” (p. 14).
The Netherlands has gone much farther than demanding that
employers should “give consideration” to employees who wish to
transfer between full-time and part-time work. The Act on Adjustment
of Working Hours (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur), which went into
effect July 1, 2000, gives those employed by firms with more than 10
employees the right to shorten or increase work hours on request if
they have been employed for at least one year and have not asked for a
change in working hours within the past two years. Within four months
prior to changing work hours, the employee should indicate the date
that the new working hours take effect, the number of working hours,
and the preferred distribution of working hours during the week. The
employer should, in principle, agree to the request and is obliged to
indicate any reason for disagreement. The hourly wage remains the
same. Because this applies only to workers employed for at least one
year, this right excludes temporary workers with a contract of less than
one year. 
What was the reason that the right to shorten or lengthen work
hours was accepted first in the Netherlands? Usually, in the Nether-
lands when a law is accepted, it codifies already existing practice,
which is included in most collective labor agreements at the time the
act passes. This has meant that many feminist demands have been late
to materialize in the Netherlands (Gustafsson 1994). In the Swedish
social democratic tradition of “social engineering,” in contrast, legisla-
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tive changes are meant to change behavior. However, as of 1993, the
advisory council on Dutch Labor Market Issues had proposed that col-
lective bargaining agreements give “social partners”—representatives
of employers and employees—the right to arrange part-time work.
Between 1990 and 1996, the percentage of firms covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement with the right to demand part-time work
increased from 23 percent to 70 percent (DeVries and van Hoorn
1997). Most requests were granted between January and June 1996. By
2000, two-thirds of employed women worked part-time and one-fifth
of employed men worked part-time. There is also a high structural
demand for part-time workers in the Netherlands.
In the Dutch “consensus” economy, if two university departments,
for example, are competing to install a chair, they may each be given
half of a professor’s chair. Therefore, it is not uncommon in the aca-
demic world for a person to combine two part-time jobs. Another
example is that rather than the local community government starting
and running an activity such as child care, as it would do in Sweden,
the Dutch economy relies on private initiatives, and the government
subsidizes a portion of those activities, allowing entrepreneurs to com-
pete with other entrepreneurs in the field. Often there are funds to
employ someone part-time rather than full-time. Therefore, there is a
demand for part-time workers in the public or nonprofit sectors.
In the private sector, using part-time employees can increase flexi-
bility; the firm can often adjust hours to meet business demands. Also,
two part-time workers who share a job can substitute for each other in
case of sickness and vacation by occasionally working full-time. Fur-
ther, employers consider part-time workers to be as committed as full-
time workers (Tijdens 1998). Also, Kalleberg and Reynolds (in this
volume) find that Dutch part-time workers are as committed as full-
time workers.
This shift to part-time work in the Netherlands would not have
occurred had it not been for the large supply of workers who prefer a
part-time job. Since the mid-1980s, unions in the Netherlands have
been raising demands for doing all work on a part-time basis and for
equalizing the employment conditions between full-time workers and
part-time workers. Earlier, the women's movement had demanded
shorter work days, but realizing that travel time would not be reduced,
interest in part-time work has grown. Women wanted to stay in the
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labor market after marriage or after giving birth to children. Skilled
women increasingly wanted to combine part-time work with family
responsibilities. Women’s increasing skills made the costs of replacing
these employees higher. Also, with unemployment high, women's
incomes were needed in the family. Toward the end of the 1980s, 40 to
45 percent of potential female reentrants were looking for a job. By the
early 1990s, there were 100,000 female reentrants per year (OSA
1995). Many of these women preferred to work part-time. Employers
began to recognize the benefits of part-time work in optimizing person-
nel strategies, for example, in the banking sector (Tijdens 1997). In the
tight labor market of the 1990s, fear of labor shortages encouraged
employers who otherwise were reluctant to accept part-time workers
(Tijdens 1998).
The situation in Sweden in the late 1990s was opposite that in the
Netherlands. In Sweden, women’s demand for part-time jobs was
declining from a peak in the 1970s. Swedish legislation views full-
time, regular contracts as the norm for both men and women, and spe-
cial leaves are allowed to make it possible to combine a regular full-
time job with family responsibilities. Since 1974, parental leave covers
both fathers and mothers, and they can choose to split the 12 months of
leave, with benefits of 75 to 90 percent of previous earnings. A couple
can choose between a mother staying home full-time, father full-time
at home, both part-time at home, or any combination. They can also
change the mix as many times as they wish, with advance employer
notice. When the child is 18 months old, the job protection period
expires, but the mother or the father has the right to shorten work hours
in her or his regular job to 30 hours a week until the youngest child is
eight years old (Gustafsson 1994). Mostly it is the mother who makes
use of this right.
Sweden adopted a variant of the EU 1997 part-time directive in
1997, which allows a part-time employee to request full-time work,
and the employer must give priority to the part-time worker should a
full-time job become available. This obligation, however, is only valid
if 1) the part-time employee has given notice, 2) the part-time
employee is qualified for the job, and 3) the employer's work needs
will be satisfied by this transfer (SOU 1999).
In Sweden in 1997, the proportion unemployed among part-time
female workers was 30 percent, and 25 percent among part-time work-
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ing men (SOU 1999, p. 153). This was up from 12 percent of part-time
working women in 1990 and 10 percent of part-time working men. The
economic recession deepened during this timespan, with unemploy-
ment peaking in 1997. The Swedish unemployment benefits are avail-
able to part-time workers for a maximum of 300 days.
The typical part-time unemployed individual is a married or cohab-
iting woman with a short (two-year) secondary education (i.e., com-
pleted school by age 18), who works in health care or the retail trade.
Many of these women have children and do not wish to work evenings
and nights, where the demand for extra workers is greater (SOU 1999).
The large proportion who wish to work full-time among Swedish
part-time workers scores with the findings of Kalleberg and Reynolds
(in this volume) that Swedish part-time workers are significantly less
happy than full-time employees; this differs from other countries in the
Kalleberg and Reynolds study. Swedish part-time workers have less
job satisfaction, less organizational commitment, more absenteeism,
and are less willing to spend extra effort if it is temporarily needed by
the employer. 
Germany has adopted a version of the EU part-time directive that
is similar to Sweden’s. If an individual employee wishes to switch
from full-time to part-time work, the employer must inform the worker
of any part-time vacancies (see Schömann and Schömann in this vol-
ume). However, there is no guarantee of the transfer. Part-time jobs are
usually not available in high-skilled professions, and therefore, a gen-
eral right to shorten work hours in any job is far from being realized in
Germany. Furthermore, the introduction of part-time work is subject to
co-determination by the works councils (see Schömann and Schö-
mann), which may consist solely of men, who are eager to protect their
full-time jobs. However, new German legislation is under way that will
mirror that in the Netherlands, with an almost full right of the
employed to work the desired number of hours in any job (Evans, Lip-
poldt, and Marianna 2001). 
The Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany have legislated that part-
time workers be treated the same as full-time workers in hourly wages
and in work-related benefits (proportional to hours worked). Such leg-
islation has, until recently, been absent in Britain. British part-time
workers, who are mainly women, can appeal to the Labor Courts under
sex and race discrimination legislation (see Schömann and Schömann
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in this volume), a situation similar to that in the United States (see
Houseman and Osawa in this volume). A government proposal for the
“Prevention of Less Favorable Treatment” was introduced in 2000.
The proposal, however, does not cover temporary agency workers (see
Schömann and Schömann).
SELF-EMPLOYMENT: ENTREPRENEURIAL 
INVENTIVENESS OR HIDDEN DEPENDENT 
EMPLOYMENT?
The German legislature has expressed concern that certain self-
employment is a hidden form of dependent employment. In January
1999, the “Correction Law of Social Provision” was introduced to pre-
vent individuals from being relabeled as self-employed by their
employer, and thus losing all rights under their employment contract. If
a worker meets two of four of the following criteria, employment is
deemed dependent and he or she is given a labor contract. The criteria
are: 1) the self-employed has no employees except family, 2) the busi-
ness serves only one customer, 3) the business operates under no spe-
cial qualifications or tasks, and 4) there is no professional contact with
clients (see Schömann and Schömann, in this volume). To our knowl-
edge, no similar legislation exists in Sweden, the Netherlands, or Brit-
ain.
In Sweden, activities previously performed by employed individu-
als are now performed by self-employed contractors. A forestry com-
pany, for example, that once had people on its payroll to collect and
deliver wood now would hire an independent contractor who owns a
tree cutting and processing machine (skogsmaskin). In construction,
home repair, and restoration independent contractors are now more
common, a development facilitated by the mobile telephone, which
makes the self-employed available for potential customers while work-
ing. Such independent contractors also often work together in net-
works, which allows them by cooperation to take on bigger tasks.
There is probably also a gendered distribution over industries and
occupations. Carré (in this volume) notes that, in the United States,
independent contractors among men are executives, professionals, and
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salespersons whereas female independent contractors often offer
domestic help, child care, real estate services, and sales.
In Sweden, entrepreneurship has been seen as a way to lower
unemployment. Individuals can receive start-up grants that cover living
costs for six months. The size of the benefit equals the unemployment
benefit. Schömann and Schömann (in this volume) report that 78 per-
cent of persons receiving the start-up grant were employed after four
years. 
In Sweden, the industry principle in labor market relations also
applies to workers in nonstandard work arrangements. Both self-
employed and temporary workers are welcome in the respective indus-
try labor unions. Some unions in the Netherlands also welcome self-
employed. Sometimes there is little difference between a network of
self-employed and a temporary work agency catering to a specific
industry. An example is a company called Industrikompetens (SOU
1999).
Industrikompetens operates like a temporary help agency in that
workers perform in different companies according to the workload.
However, Industrikompetens is owned by 20 firms in the Swedish
region of Östergötland that deliver to the car and truck manufacturer
SAAB. Before forming Industrikompetens, the different companies
had periods when they could not take orders because they lacked quali-
fied personnel and periods when they had to pay employees for whom
there was no work. The 20 competitors now own Industrikompetens,
and its personnel are trained and accustomed to the work in a number
of the owner firms so that extra work needs can be performed. 
Similar to Swedish policies, Dutch policies also aim to stimulate
entrepreneurship. In 1996, the number of entrepreneurs as a percentage
of the Dutch workforce was the same as in 1972, and was low com-
pared with the mean in the European Union and the United States
(Ministry of Economic Affairs 2001). The growth within these new
businesses is also less than in other countries. Deregulation and lower-
ing administrative costs to start and develop firms are important policy
objectives. For example, because the industry is overregulated, the ini-
tial administrative costs for a firm installing electrotechnical equip-
ment requires an investment of fl 6.000 and two months’ work. The
administrative costs incurred in hiring an employee are estimated to be
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fl 3.300, with at least 17 hours needed to deal with the administrative
tasks (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2001). 
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs aims in addition to
increase “intrapreneurship,” that is, small businesses within big firms,
to compete in highly specialized markets. Individuals starting their
own business in the Netherlands receive a tax deduction in the first
year if the number of business hours exceed 1,225. This means that
starting a firm on a part-time basis is not stimulated by this regulation
(Gustafsson, Wetzels, and Tijdens 2000). Despite this, the percentage
of women among all persons starting a business has increased to 31
percent in 1999 (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2001). By contrast,
starting a business on a part-time basis while keeping a part-time job is
widespread in Sweden, as will be evident from our data analysis below.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON NONSTANDARD WORK 
USING MICRODATA SETS
The previous sections have identified characteristics in institutions
and policies in the four countries that may explain differences between
the countries in their approaches to nonstandard work. In the following
section, we turn to microdata analysis using the 1998 wave of the
household panel data BHPS for Britain, GSOEP for Germany, OSA for
the Netherlands, and HUS for Sweden. We use the German data for
western and eastern Germany separately as they are made available
rather than aggregating the data. One important reason for not aggre-
gating the data is that, in many respects, the eastern half of Germany is
different from the western half.
We restrict the analysis to employed persons for three reasons.
First, all other chapters of this book refer to nonstandard work among
employed people. Second, including those who have chosen to remain
out of the labor force and those who are unemployed would require a
lengthy review of policies and institutions among the countries to
explain the differences in nonemployment. This would complicate the
story and add several pages of policy analysis. Third, we have more
information about employed persons than nonemployed persons.
Occupation and industry are available for all employed persons
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whether they are employed full-time regular, part-time regular, fixed-
term, or self-employed. This makes it possible to compare choices by
otherwise similar people. 
In Table 7.1, we present information (including the rate of nonem-
ployed persons) aged 16–64, by gender (in the remainder of the chap-
ter, we disregard the nonemployed). In the Swedish data, the age range
is 18–64. In the Dutch data, full-time students are not interviewed,
which increases the employment rate among young people given that
only employed individuals aged 16–19 are included. This differs from
the British and German data, where secondary school students are
interviewed.











Men 19.7 68.2 12.1 3,725
Women 32.0 63.4 4.6 4,420
Western Germany
Men 25.0 65.9 9.1 1,802
Women 50.4 45.6 4.0 2,014
Eastern Germany
Men 30.6 63.2 6.3 1,178
Women 45.3 50.9 3.8 1,257
The Netherlands
Men 18.0 73.6 8.4 1,543
Women 47.0 48.1 4.9 1,856
Sweden
Men 19.3 65.2 15.5 1,519
Women 25.6 69.3 5.1 1,506
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on BHPS 1998 for Britain; Sample A (Ger-
man residents in former West Germany) of GSOEP 1998 for western Germany; Sam-
ple C (German residents in former East Germany) of GSOEP 1998 for eastern
Germany; OSA 1998 for the Netherlands; and HUS 1998 for Sweden. See Appendix
A for a detailed definition of variables.
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The rate of nonemployed men in western Germany is surprisingly
high, even considering the fact that the inclusion of secondary school
students increases the rate (OECD 1998). The labor force participation
rate for men in western Germany should be similar to that in Sweden,
which it is not, and the labor force participation rate of women in west-
ern Germany should be similar to that of women in the Netherlands,
which it is. Whereas 25 percent of men in western Germany are not
employed, in Sweden, Britain, and the Netherlands, the corresponding
rates are between 18.0 and 19.7 percent.
A noted difference in our data is the greater proportion of Swedish
self-employed men compared with German men. In western Germany,
9.1 percent of men are self-employed compared with 15.5 percent of
Swedish men. The gap in the rate of nonemployed between women in
the Netherlands and Germany is narrowed if women who are on leave
are counted as employed in Germany. However, we cannot include
those on leave in the German data because there is no information on
type of contract, industry, and occupation. In the Swedish data, those
who are on leave fewer than two months are counted as employed,
whereas in the Dutch data, there is no information on leave status.
Dutch full-time maternity leave is only 16 weeks; therefore, not as
many Dutch women would be on leave compared with German
women, who receive maternity leave for up to three years. A detailed
description of definition of variables is presented in Appendix A.
Table 7.2 presents tabulations of all information available in our
data sets on dependent employed, self-employed, or a combination
according to type of contract and whether full-time or part-time. The
dividing line between full-time and part-time is 35 hours of work per
week. British and Swedish men are much more often self-employed
than the women in their countries. For the other countries, the differ-
ence between male and female self-employment is less distinct. The
Netherlands clearly has the highest percentage of women in regular
part-time jobs (58.5 percent), the second highest percentage of women
in part-time fixed term (5.1 percent), and the highest percentage of
self-employed women working part-time. The Netherlands also has the
highest percentage of men in part-time regular jobs (9 percent); the
percentage in the other countries does not exceed 3.8 percent. The pro-
portion of self-employed among Dutch men is lower than among men
in the other countries, except for eastern Germany. 
232Table 7.2 Employment by Type of Contract and Whether Full-Time or Part-Time in 1998 (% of those who are 
gainfully employed)
Britain Western Germany Eastern Germany Netherlands Sweden
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Dependent employed 84.9 93.3 87.9 91.9 90.9 93.0 89.7 90.8 80.8 93.1
Of which:
Regular, FT 74.8 48.7 75.9 42.5 76.5 60.8 77.1 25.6 72.4 55.5
Regular, PT 3.5 35.2 3.6 39.9 2.2 15.7 9.0 58.5 3.8 30.1
Fixed-term, FT 4.3 2.8 7.3 6.8 11.4 13.2 2.6 1.5 3.4 3.8
Fixed-term, PT 2.3 6.5 1.0 2.7 0.9 3.3 1.0 5.1 1.2 3.8
Of which:






Special programs 1.0 0.8
Contract company 2.5 1.6
Self-employed 15.1 6.8 12.1 8.1 9.1 7.0 10.3 7.1 11.4 4.5
Full-time 13.0 3.4 10.7 4.9 8.4 5.8 8.9 3.0 10.4 3.6
Part-time 2.1 3.4 1.5 3.2 0.6 1.2 1.3 4.2 1.0 0.9
Of which:
Self-employed farmer 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.2
Professional worker 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.7
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Other self-employed
Without employees 3.0 3.9 3.3 2.8
With 1–9 employees 5.0 1.6 3.3 1.9
With 10 or more employees 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.2
Family member helping out 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.3
Own businessa 2.9 1.4
Partner in businessb 2.5 1.4




Family workersd 0.0 2.1
Self-employed and dependent 
employed 
7.8 2.4
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
983 1,226 1,120
a Running a business or a professional practice.
b Partner in a business or a professional practice.
c Working for myself. 
d In Dutch “meewerkende echtgenote” (wife helping out in business of her husband). 
SOURCE: Computations based on BHPS, GSOEP, OSA, and HUS (see note 1). For definition of variables, see Appendix A.
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The Dutch data show more details on irregular contracts (Table
7.2). Dutch women are in irregular contracts more often than men. This
is especially true for work in temporary help agencies. Dutch men with
irregular contracts are concentrated in contract company work. 
The German data offer more detailed information on the self-
employed than other countries. The self-employed are categorized as
either farmers, professionals, “other” self-employed in various-sized
firms, or employed by family members. Approximately one-fifth of the
self-employed women in both western and eastern Germany are pro-
fessional workers. Another one-fifth are “other” self-employed and
work in firms of fewer than ten employees, and about half work in
firms with no other employees. The numbers in family operations are
quite low (0.5 percent among western German women) and also low
compared with the Netherlands (2.1 percent). In Britain, most of the
self-employed work for themselves and, to a lesser extent, operate a
business or a professional practice with or without partners. British
men, but few women, tend to be subcontractors. 
RESULTS OF MULTINOMIAL LOGITS AND WAGE 
REGRESSIONS
In the following, we analyze four different employment choices:
full-time with a regular contract (“full-time”); part-time with a regular
contract (“part-time”); fixed-term contract, full-time or part-time
(“fixed-term”); and self-employed (“self-employed”). We proceed to
merge the data from the four countries into one data set with the pur-
pose of interpreting country dummies in light of policy differences dis-
cussed above. We summarize the results of three multinomial logit
models on country-pooled data in Tables 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5, and country-
specific wage regressions using national currency in Tables 7.6, 7.7,
and 7.8. 
We analyze how otherwise similar people end up in different work
arrangements and the wage differences using three separate models.
The first model includes both men and women and includes a dummy
variable for women. The second model includes only men, and the
third model includes only women. The joint model allows us to analyze
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Table 7. 3 Multinomial Logit Analysis: Relative Probability of 
Employment State for Both Sexes (Reference state is 
full-time work)
Part-time Fixed-term Self-employed
RRR Z-value RRR Z-value RRR Z-value
Women 12.420 35.26 2.007 9.05 1.196 2.59
Britain 0.434 –11.18 1.101 0.80 1.251 2.41
Western Germany 0.503 –7.73 1.738 4.15 1.262 2.14
Eastern Germany 0.152 –15.67 2.159 5.69 0.656 –3.25
Sweden 0.307 –12.97 1.299 1.85 1.250 2.15
Netherlands = base
Educational groups
Low 1.117 1.62 1.064 0.70 0.727 –3.99
Medium = base
High 0.647 –5.49 0.982 –0.18 0.789 –2.74
Age groups
16–24 0.855 –1.45 5.842 15.56 0.209 –8.41
25–34 0.605 –6.77 1.314 2.66 0.620 –5.54
35–44 = base
45–54 1.414 4.53 0.787 –1.90 1.553 5.40
55–64 2.579 9.76 0.988 –0.08 2.223 8.01
Married or cohabiting 1.181 2.39 0.552 –7.28 0.911 –1.13
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years)
in the household
No children = base
1 child 2.262 9.54 1.121 0.84 1.241 2.12
2 or more children 3.208 11.61 1.610 3.02 1.763 4.89
Age of youngest child 
in the household
0–2 1.307 2.35 0.834 –0.97 0.972 –0.21




NOTE: RRR is the relative risk ratio for a one-unit change in the corresponding variable,
and risk is measured as the risk of the category relative to the base category. Industry
(8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not
reported. The full version of estimation results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and
Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description
of variables, and Appendix B, Tables 7.B1 and 7.B2 for descriptive statistics.
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Table 7.4 Multinomial Logit Analysis: Relative Probability of 
Employment State for Men (Reference state is full-time work)
Part-time Fixed-term Self-employed
RRR Z-value RRR Z-value RRR Z-value
Britain 0.378 –6.27 1.311 1.47 2.085 6.26
Western Germany 0.439 –4.48 2.644 4.95 1.727 4.03
Eastern Germany 0.273 –4.88 3.398 5.98 0.949 –0.31
Sweden 0.468 –4.06 1.988 3.14 2.401 6.79
Netherlands = base
Educational groups
Low 0.889 –0.77 0.879 –0.96 0.877 –1.30
Medium = base
High 0.854 –0.92 0.934 –0.44 0.764 –2.44
Age groups
16–24 3.185 5.07 8.564 12.10 0.251 –5.99
25–34 1.044 0.23 1.574 2.74 0.673 –3.64
35–44 = base
45–54 1.294 1.32 0.915 –0.46 1.719 5.37
55–64 3.497 6.17 0.880 –0.51 2.355 7.07
Married or cohabiting 0.676 –2.45 0.511 –5.13 0.733 –2.92
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years)
in the household
No children = base
1 child 0.633 –1.68 0.670 –1.55 1.044 0.32
2 or more children 0.775 –0.83 0.545 –1.86 1.465 2.62
Age of youngest child in the
household
0–2 1.988 2.18 1.157 0.45 0.985 –0.09




NOTE: RRR is the relative risk ratio for a one-unit change in the corresponding variable,
and risk is measured as the risk of the category relative to the base category. Industry
(8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not
reported. The full version of estimation results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and
Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description of
variables, and Appendix B, Tables 7.B1 and 7.B2 for descriptive statistics.
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Table 7.5 Multinomial Logit Analysis: Relative Probability of 
Employment State for Women (Reference state is full-time 
work)
Part-time Fixed-term Self-employed
RRR Z-value RRR Z-value RRR Z-value
Britain 0.317 –11.63 0.723 –1.98 0.405 –5.72
Western Germany 0.422 –7.38 1.041 0.21 0.663 –2.18
Eastern Germany 0.100 –15.88 1.210 1.02 0.302 –5.60
Sweden 0.187 –14.45 0.620 –2.47 0.300 –6.42
Netherlands = base
Educational groups
Low 1.113 1.28 1.179 1.37 0.557 –4.18
Medium = base
High 0.591 –5.52 0.995 –0.04 0.836 –1.24
Age groups
16–24 0.543 –4.81 3.951 9.14 0.150 –5.86
25–34 0.436 –9.21 0.934 –0.51 0.440 –5.61
35–44 = base
45–54 1.463 4.18 0.705 –2.06 1.439 2.54
55–64 2.371 7.31 1.043 0.19 2.295 4.52
Married or cohabiting 1.548 5.50 0.698 –3.42 1.417 2.55
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years)
in the household
No children = base
1 child 3.303 11.45 1.588 2.73 1.952 3.94
2 or more children 6.480 14.30 3.841 6.84 3.942 6.80
Age of youngest child in 
the household
0–2 1.508 2.72 0.942 –0.24 1.178 0.65




NOTE: RRR is the relative risk ratio for a one-unit change in the corresponding variable,
and risk is measured as the risk of the category relative to the base category. Industry
(8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not
reported. The full version of estimation results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and
Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description of
variables, and Appendix B, Tables 7.B1 and 7.B2 for descriptive statistics.
238Table 7.6 OLS Regressions on the Logarithm of Hourly Wage in National Currency for Both Sexes
Britain Western Germany Eastern Germany Netherlands Sweden
Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value
Women –0.156 –12.17 –0.141 –7.79 –0.126 –5.03 –0.181 –9.94 –0.168 –14.82
Part-time –0.131 –8.44 –0.203 –9.53 –0.036 –0.94 –0.005 –0.26 0.020 1.46
Fixed-term –0.117 –5.78 –0.466 –16.22 –0.420 –13.21 –0.177 –5.48 –0.083 –4.06
Educational groups
Low –0.091 –5.77 –0.068 –3.46 –0.098 –3.78 –0.105 –6.38 –0.081 –6.46
Medium = base
High 0.050 3.09 0.163 6.38 0.117 3.50 0.126 6.54 0.126 9.01
Age groups
16–24 –0.313 –16.51 –0.522 –14.96 –0.430 –10.84 –0.402 –13.65 –0.190 –6.78
25–34 –0.082 –5.59 –0.108 –5.71 0.015 0.53 –0.147 –7.67 –0.085 –5.82
35–44 = base
45–54 –0.028 –1.68 0.072 3.36 0.008 0.29 0.071 3.60 0.047 3.48
55–64 –0.071 –3.03 0.058 2.23 –0.015 –0.41 0.143 4.82 0.073 4.68
Married or cohabiting 0.045 3.37 0.017 0.93 0.083 2.90 0.075 3.92 0.010 0.73
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years) 
in the household
No children = base
1 child 0.017 0.86 0.002 0.09 –0.016 –0.54 0.006 0.25 0.037 2.24
2 or more children 0.024 1.06 0.093 3.03 –0.049 –1.06 0.039 1.50 0.036 1.81
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Age of youngest child 
in the household
0–2 0.042 1.75 0.017 0.48 0.039 0.65 0.025 0.89 0.008 0.30
3–5 0.019 0.75 0.022 0.65 –0.044 –0.82 –0.017 –0.56 0.030 1.28
Constant 1.934 81.78 3.266 106.9 2.84 65.16 3.229  105.1 4.659 219.6
N 4,787 1,927 1,274 1,624 1,927
Adj. R2 0.451 0.568 0.510 0.539 0.351
NOTE: Industry (8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not reported. The full version of estima-
tion results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description
of variables, and Appendix B, Tables 7.B1 and 7.B2 for descriptive statistics.
240Table 7.7 OLS Regressions on the Logarithm of Hourly Wage in National Currency for Men
Britain Western Germany Eastern Germany Netherlands Sweden
Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value
Part-time –0.094 –2.32 –0.223 –4.61 –0.062 –0.55 0.053 1.77 0.071 2.00
Fixed-term –0.178 –5.68 –0.466 –12.34 –0.455 –9.28 –0.200 –4.07 –0.106 –3.11
Full-time = base
Educational groups
Low –0.096 –4.20 –0.063 –2.48 –0.131 –3.46 –0.106 –4.87 –0.085 –4.62
Medium = base
High 0.036 1.59 0.194 6.08 0.027 0.54 0.150 5.92 0.126 5.77
Age groups
16–24 –0.370 –13.18 –0.637 –13.03 –0.396 –6.38 –0.473 –10.82 –0.183 –4.38
25–34 –0.096 –4.60 –0.122 –5.18 0.038 1.02 –0.192 –7.60 –0.105 –4.68
35–44 = base
45–54 –0.009 –0.35 0.090 3.33 0.031 0.79 0.102 4.09 0.061 3.02
55–64 –0.093 –2.77 0.059 1.82 –0.075 –1.52 0.175 4.80 0.066 2.81
Married or cohabiting 0.080 3.82 0.056 2.25 0.075 1.72 0.110 4.05 0.034 1.61
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years)
in the household
No children = base
1 child 0.062 2.02 –0.012 –0.39 –0.012 –0.30 0.006 0.19 0.066 2.41
2 or more children 0.092 2.75 0.079 2.09 –0.078 –1.26 0.040 1.20 0.059 1.75
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Age of youngest child in 
the household
0–2 –0.065 –1.86 0.048 1.22 0.036 0.51 0.003 0.08 –0.053 –1.14
3–5 –0.047 –1.22 0.008 0.21 0.005 0.07 –0.042 –1.10 0.026 0.64
Constant 1.962 61.20 3.267 89.20 2.880 48.30 3.230 84.95 4.636 150.30
N 2,264 1,106 682 916 944
Adj. R2 0.444 0.601 0.491 0.562 0.284
NOTE: Industry (8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not reported. The full version of estima-
tion results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description
of variables, and Appendix B, Table 7.B1 for the descriptive statistics.
242Table 7.8 OLS Regressions on the Logarithm of Hourly Wage in National Currency for Women
Britain Western Germany Eastern Germany Netherlands Sweden
Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value
Part-time –0.099 –5.56 –0.139 –4.87 –0.024 –0.57 –0.001 –0.02 0.017 1.22
Fixed-term –0.064 –2.41 –0.417 –9.44 –0.394 –9.39 –0.132 –2.94 –0.073 –2.98
Full-time = base
Educational groups
Low –0.067 –3.09 –0.077 –2.51 –0.060 –1.66 –0.092 –3.76 –0.069 –4.02
Medium = base
High 0.067 3.01 0.153 3.63 0.210 4.65 0.092 3.21 0.136 7.31
Age groups
16–24 –0.263 –10.24 –0.428 –8.49 –0.429 –8.16 –0.382 –9.50 –0.198 –5.26
25–34 –0.057 –2.83 –0.072 –2.28 –0.013 –0.32 –0.109 –3.71 –0.060 –3.16
35–44 = base
45–54 –0.046 –1.98 0.040 1.17 –0.007 –0.16 –0.003 –0.11 0.026 1.42
55–64 –0.065 –2.03 0.047 1.10 0.069 1.25 0.044 0.90 0.065 3.10
Married or cohabiting 0.007 0.42 –0.044 –1.63 0.081 2.14 0.011 0.40 –0.007 –0.40
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years) 
in the household
No children = base
1 child –0.020 –0.79 –0.013 –0.32 –0.012 –0.29 –0.029 –0.75 0.010 0.50
2 or more children –0.041 –1.37 0.038 0.72 –0.022 –0.30 0.022 0.53 0.012 0.48
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Age of youngest child 
in the household
0–2 0.118 3.63 –0.166 –1.95 0.063 0.40 0.068 1.54 0.044 1.30
3–5 0.049 1.44 0.060 1.03 –0.103 –1.16 0.006 0.12 0.020 0.74
Constant 1.665 42.06 3.088 52.42 2.669 37.36 3.033 45.43 4.516 134.57
N 2523 821 592 708 983
Adj. R2 0.409 0.469 0.548 0.449 0.297
NOTE: Industry (8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not reported. The full version of estima-
tion results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description
of variables, and Appendix B, Table 7.B2 for the descriptive statistics.
244 Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels
how otherwise similar men and women compare in work outcomes.
Estimating separate models for men and women allows us to analyze,
for example, whether male part-time work differs between the coun-
tries studies. Houseman (1999) notes that an individual in the United
States who works in a nonstandard work arrangement is likely to be
female, young, low paid, and desiring a standard work arrangement.
We find (Table 7.3) that, all else equal, women in the four European
countries we study are 12 times as likely as men to work part-time, are
twice as likely to have a fixed-term contract, and they are also 20 per-
cent more likely than otherwise similar men to be self-employed. The
first part of Houseman’s observation for the United States, therefore,
also applies to the four countries we study. The second observation of
Houseman, that nonstandard workers earn less than standard workers,
is not generally true in the four European countries we study. All else
equal, women earn 12 to 18 percent less than men (Table 7.6). Work-
ing part-time or with a fixed-term contract carries a negative wage
effect, except for part-time work in eastern Germany, the Netherlands,
and Sweden (Table 7.6). However, separating by gender (Tables 7.7
and 7.8) modifies the picture.
Swedish men working part-time earn more per hour than full-time
workers (Table 7.7), a result that badly scores with the fact that so
many part-time workers in Sweden are part-time unemployed. How-
ever, even if 25 percent of part-time working men are part-time unem-
ployed (see “The Changing Status of Part-Time Work,” above), 75
percent may, to a large extent, be part-time retirees with a relatively
high hourly wage. Part-time work among men is most common in the
oldest age group, aged 55–64, and the youngest age group, aged 16–24
(Table 7.3).
Part-Time Work
The country dummy variables of the multinomial logits are of spe-
cial interest in light of policy and institutional differences between
countries. The Netherlands is confirmed as the largest part-time econ-
omy in the world. All else equal, there are many more part-time work-
ing men and women in the Netherlands than in the other countries
(Tables 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5). As noted, we treat the eastern part of Ger-
many (the former DDR) and the western part of Germany (the former
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FRG) as two different countries. The data justify such a treatment
because eastern and western Germany often reveal sharper distinctions
than one would expect from one country affected by a given set of
institutions. For example, there is very little part-time work in eastern
Germany but considerable part-time work in western Germany, placing
western Germany second in ranking after the Netherlands for men and
women combined and for women only (Tables 7.3 and 7.5). Germany
is ranked as such even though the probability of working part-time is
only 40 percent to 50 percent as large in western Germany as in the
Netherlands. Among eastern German women, however, the likelihood
of working part-time is only one-tenth that in the Netherlands.
All else equal, the probability of a Swedish woman working part-
time is only one-fifth that of a similar Dutch woman (Table 7.5). This
is a sharp drop compared with the aggregate figure of 23 percent part-
time workers among employed Swedes and 39 percent among
employed Dutch in 1999 (Fagan and Ward, Table 3.1, in this volume)
and also compared with the results in Table 7.2. Our raw data in Table
7.2 show that the proportion part-time among Dutch employed women
is 58.5 percent, and the corresponding figure for Swedish women is
30.1 percent. 
This difference is likely explained by the fact that Swedish part-
time working women are much more concentrated in a certain category
that we control for in our multinomial logit analysis, whereas in the
Netherlands, part-time work is more evenly spread among all types of
women. Nearly all Swedish mothers make use of the right to work 30
hours per week in their regular full-time work until the youngest child
is eight years old. Because we control for whether there is a child
younger than age 12 in the household, this variable catches the Swed-
ish mothers making use of this family policy. Again, this result may
modify the large amount of part-time unemployed among Swedish
women, 30 percent, who would be spread over all kinds of women.
However, the other 70 percent may be concentrated among women
with young children. This control variable is also highly significant
(Table 7.5); women with one young child are three times more likely to
work part-time, and those with two or more young children are six
times more likely to work part-time. Perhaps the effect of young chil-
dren would have been even larger in a separate model for Swedish
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women than it is in Table 7.5, where women from all four countries are
included.
Part-time workers in western Germany earn at least 20 percent less
per hour than otherwise similar full-time workers (Table 7.6). This is
hardly the equal treatment of part-time work and full-time workers
demanded by the EU 1997 directive and by German legislation. How-
ever, this is in line with the remark by Schömann and Schömann (in
this volume) that part-time work is not available in skilled occupations,
which differs from the Netherlands, where there is a general right to
shorten or lengthen work hours in any job. In Britain, where no such
legislation exists, the pay disadvantage for part-time workers is smaller
both for men and women than it is in western Germany. 
An explanation for the phenomenon that western German part-time
workers earn substantially less than full-time workers, despite equal
pay laws, is that for these laws to be effective, part-time and full-time
workers must hold comparable jobs within firms. If all positions in a
particular occupation within a firm are part-time, then a firm can
legally pay these part-time workers low wages. Part-time workers are
probably concentrated in low-skill occupations in Germany and in
Britain, which has no equal-pay legislation for part-time workers,
whereas in Sweden and the Netherlands, part-time workers hold a
broad spectrum of occupations, including high-skill occupations.
Fixed-Term Work
In both eastern and western Germany, the probability of working
under a fixed-term contract is much higher than in the other countries.
For men, it is 2.6 to 3.4 times more common in Germany than in the
Netherlands, and for women, the probability is almost equal to that in
the Netherlands. Above it was shown that a fixed-term contract in Ger-
many is seen as an alternative to unemployment (see “Flexibility of the
Labor Market and Protection of Workers” above). One can therefore
assume that German workers who have fixed-term contracts may not
be the most competitive workers. There is also the largest negative
wage effect in Germany (–0.42 to –0.46) compared with full-time
work, which translates to a wage ratio of only 63 percent to 66 percent
of regular worker hourly wages, all else equal (Table 7.6). This nega-
tive wage effect is similar for men and women (Tables 7.7 and 7.8).
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In Britain, there are relatively few fixed-term contracts. As
explained by Fagan and Ward (in this volume), there is no reason for a
British firm to offer a fixed-term contract for a period shorter than one
year because all workers’ rights in Britain apply only after the worker
has been employed for at least one year. The Netherlands has many
fixed-term contracts for women but few for men, all else equal (Tables
7.4 and 7.5). There are, for example, twice as many Swedish as Dutch
men on fixed-term contracts, but only 62 percent as many Swedish as
Dutch women on fixed-term contracts, all else equal (Tables 7.4 and
7.5). There are more restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts in
Sweden than in the Netherlands, given that a Swedish firm must spec-
ify the reason why a fixed-term contract is offered rather than a regular
contract. In Sweden, the typical fixed-term contract worker is a female
substituting for someone on leave in the public health care sector. This
scores with the fixed-term worker of Table 7.3. The probability of
being a fixed-term worker doubles (2.0 in Table 7.3) if one is female,
almost doubles if employed in the public and nonprofit sector (1.9),
and is almost six times larger (5.8) if aged 16–24. In addition, a woman
who has two or more children is almost four times as likely to have a
fixed-term contract as women without children (Table 7.5). For men
and women combined, Sweden has more workers with fixed-term con-
tracts than all other countries except eastern Germany (Table 7.3),
although the right to offer fixed-term contracts is quite regulated (see
“Flexibility of the Labor Market and Protection of Workers,” above).
The largest proportion of fixed-term workers, twice as many as in the
Netherlands, is found in eastern Germany (Table 7.3).
Self-Employed
The German legislature has concerns that self-employment may be
hidden dependent employment (see “Self-Employment: Entrepreneur-
ial Inventiveness or Hidden Dependent Employment?” above). Self-
employment is about equally prevalent in Britain, western Germany,
and Sweden, and less common in the Netherlands and eastern Ger-
many. We were unable to analyze wage differentials between self-
employed and employed workers because of vague reporting of earn-
ings and hours worked by the self-employed. If there were self-
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employment among “weaker” workers, one would have seen a nega-
tive wage effect. 
The Swedish legislature has viewed self-employment as an alterna-
tive to unemployment, which may also coincide with lower earnings.
There is substantially more self-employment among men (Table 7.4) in
Sweden, Britain, and western Germany than in the Netherlands, and
substantially less self-employment among women than in the Nether-
lands (Table 7.5). The results score with the observation for the United
States by Carré (in this volume) that independent contractors among
men are executives, professionals, and salespersons, whereas female
independent contractors offer domestic help, child care, real estate, ser-
vices, and sales. A self-employed woman offering child care would be
classified as public or nonprofit sector and a service worker.
CONCLUSION
The analysis in this chapter provides a partial answer to a number
of questions. For example, why are there so many part-time workers,
both men and women, in the Netherlands? Sweden saw an increase in
part-time work among women in the 1970s, when combining work and
motherhood became common. A combination lifestyle has only
become acceptable and supported by public policies since the 1990s in
the Netherlands and that may be an important reason why part-time
work increased so much.
A second reason for the large proportion of part-time work in the
Netherlands can be found in the way funds are raised, for example, in
the care sector. It is customary for a private entrepreneur to compete
for public funds with other entrepreneurs and also raise funds by pri-
vate donations and user fees. It is rather likely that such a financing
system may create part-time jobs supplemented by voluntary work. A
third reason, from the demand side, is that the Dutch consensus society
may result in two part-time jobs rather than one full-time job in the
public sector (e.g., in academics). The Netherlands is also the one
country that has legislated the right for the worker to demand increases
or decreases of work hours in any job. 
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Another question that arises from the analysis is, Why are there so
many self-employed Swedish men? The Swedish legislature views
self-employment as an alternative to unemployment, granting entrepre-
neurs who would otherwise be unemployed the right to receive a sub-
sidy equal to the unemployment benefit for half a year. Many Swedish
self-employed workers have one-person firms, and their situation is not
very different from dependently employed workers. The mobile tele-
phone has also allowed people who work in the construction and home
repair sector to be available to potential customers while at work. Peo-
ple in forestry own their own machinery and are independent entrepre-
neurs, and a hairdresser may be an independent entrepreneur renting a
chair at some firm rather than being a dependent worker of the firm. In
contrast, the German legislature has sought to decrease such practices,
claiming that it is simply masked dependent employment that should
be turned into a regular work contract in order to supply the worker
with job protection and social security benefits. This can explain a
smaller proportion of self-employed in Germany than in Sweden,
which is consistent with our findings.
Why are there so many fixed-term workers in Germany and why
are they so poorly paid? Although there are negative effects on wages
per hour of having a fixed-term contract in all the countries we study,
in both eastern and western Germany, the hourly wage of fixed-term
workers is only about 63 percent to 67 percent that of regular workers,
for both men and women. In the other countries, the fixed-term con-
tract workers have an hourly wage of 84 percent to 93 percent that of
regular workers (Tables 7.6, 7.7, and 7.8).
In Germany, fixed-term contracts have been seen as an alternative
to unemployment and there are no limits on the number of months a
person can work under a fixed-term contract if he or she is older than
60. This explains the large number of people who are employed on
fixed-term contracts in both western and eastern Germany (Tables 7.3,
7.4, and 7.5). For younger people, a fixed-term contract turns into a
regular contract after 24 months. It may be that there are exceptionally
many older people in Germany on fixed-term contracts with low pay
and they are then compared with other older employees who have bet-
ter wages because of accumulated human capital and seniority. 
Finally, the analysis raises the question of why part-time workers
are relatively better paid in Sweden and the Netherlands than in Britain
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and Germany. In Sweden, part-time work is seen as a temporary solu-
tion, and one of the parents of young children has a legal right to
shorten work hours to 30 hours a week until the youngest child is eight
years old. Part-time workers in Sweden in 1998 averaged 23.1 hours
per week compared with Britain at 17.1 hours, the Netherlands at 18.1,
and Germany at 18.3 for both men and women. Swedish mothers regu-
larly make use of 12 to 18 months of parental leave during the child's
first one and one-half years of life. By the time the child is age five, 90
percent of mothers work at least 25 hours per week, in contrast to the
other three countries. In the Netherlands, Britain, and Germany, only
about 50 percent of mothers of five-year-olds are employed, and fewer
than 10 percent are employed full-time (Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wet-
zels 2001b).
Further, part-time work in Sweden and the Netherlands occurs in
all types of occupations and in all educational groups, whereas in Brit-
ain, part-time work is very often temporary and limited to low-skilled
jobs. Part-time work is not available in higher-level jobs in Germany,
where works councils have a veto if a firm wants to install part-time
jobs.
Note
1. Another comparison across the European Union States offered by Fagan and
Ward (in this volume) is the average number of hours per week worked by a part-
time working woman. Sweden and France are the only two countries that have
averages of 23 hours per week, whereas part-time working women in most EU
countries average less than 20 hours per week. This is also the case for the Nether-






Table 7A.1 Current Labor Force Status
Not employed Dependent employed Self-employed
Britain (BHPS) • Respondent did not do any paid work 
last week;
[and]
• respondent does not have a job or is 
waiting for job.
• Respondent did paid work last week; 
or respondent did no paid work, but he/
she has a job and is on leave;
[and]
• Employed.
• Respondent did paid work last week; 
or respondent did no paid work, but he/
she has a job and is on leave;
[and]
• Self-employed
Germany (GSOEP) • Not gainfully employed; or on 
temporary work leave.
Note: Those who were on leave are 
included in “not employed” because 
they did not report the information on 
their job characteristics (type of 
contract, industry, occupation, etc.).
•Employed full-time; or employed 
part-time; or in occupational trianing, 




• Self-employed, including family 
members helping out.
Netherlands (OSA) • Unemployed, nonparticipant, full-
time student.
• Gainfully employed • Self-employed, family worker.
Sweden (HUS) • Respondent is in the labor force but 
on leave from work, more than two 
months; or respondent is looking for 
work; or respondent is not in the labor 
force.
• Respondent is employed: 1) 
performed paid work during the last 
week, 2) had time off, was ill, or was 
on leave for less than 2 months, or 3) 
was laid off but expected to return to 
work within one week;
[and]
• Salaried employee.
• Respondent is employed: 
1) performed paid work during the last 
week, 2) had time off, was ill, or was 
on leave for less than 2 months, or
 3) was laid off but expected to return 
to work within one week;
[and]
• Salaried employee;[and]
• Self-employed/professional or both 
salaried employee and self-employed
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Contract
Full-Time Work
Full-time work with a regular contract (35 hours and more worked per
week, including overtime hours).
Part-Time Work
Part-time work with a regular contract (fewer than 35 hours worked per
week, including overtime).
Fixed-Term Work
Fixed-term work is full-time or part-time work with a fixed-term contract.
Hourly Wage
Hourly wage includes gross earnings per week/(normal working hours per
week incl. paid and uinpaid overtime).
Because we do not have direct information on hourly wages, we calculate
hourly wage from gross earnings per week divided by normal working hours
per week, including paid and unpaid overtime. For gross earnings, we use gross
monthly earnings in BHPS, GSOEP, OSA, and the majority of employees in
HUS. To obtain gross earnings per week, monthly earnings are divided by 4.3.
In addition, for HUS, respondents report their earnings based on how to be
paid. Annual earnings are divided by 46, and biweekly earnings are divided by
2. When case hourly earnings are reported, this is regarded as the hourly wage.
However, after doing this procedure, we have a few very “strange” cases; that
is, wages considerably below the minimum wages or very high wages. To en-
sure wage estimations are not affected by these cases, which occurred because
of missed reporting, and other extreme cases, we exclude the observations with
Regular contract Fixed-term contract
Britain (BHPS) Permanent job Seasonal/temporary job 
contract/fixed time
Germany (GSOEP) Unlimited contract Limited contract
Netherlands (OSA) Permanent employment; 
Temporary contract with a 
view of permanent 
employment
Temporary contract
Sweden (HUS) Year-round job Temporary job; 
Seasonal work
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1 percent of the lowest and 1 percent of the highest wage distribution from our
wage estimations. The original descriptions of gross earnings and hourly wag-
es in each data set are as follows:
Gross Earnings
Britain (BHPS)
The last time you were paid, what was your gross pay—that is, including
any overtime, bonuses, commission, tips or tax refund, but before any
deductions for tax, national insurance or pension contributions, union
dues, and so on?
Germany (GSOEP)
How high were your earnings last month? If you received any additional
payments last month, e.g., holiday money or back-pay please do not
include these. Also do not include child benefits even if received from
employer. However, do include money earned for overtime. If possible
please enter for both: Gross earnings, in other words earnings before
deductions for tax and social security; net earnings, in other words the
amount after deductions for tax and social security.
Netherlands (OSA)
Gross income per month, current situation.
Sweden (HUS)
What are your regular weekly (biweekly, monthly, annual, or hourly)
earnings, before taxes and other deductions?
Working Hours per Week (including paid and unpaid overtime work)
Britain (BHPS) 1 + 2
1) Thinking about your (main) job, how many hours, excluding overtime
and meal breaks, are you expected to work in a normal week?
2) And how many hours overtime do you usually work in a normal week
(including unpaid overtime)?
Germany (GSOEP)
How many hours (per week) do you actually work, on average, including
overtime?
Netherlands (OSA) 1 + 2 + 3
1) Contracted working hours
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2) Unpaid overtime per week
3) Paid overtime per week
Sweden (HUS)
On average, how many hours per week are you currently working at your
main job, including both paid and unpaid overtime?
Education
Education high: Obtained highest qualification, requires 15 years or more
of schooling.
Education medium: Obtained highest qualification, requires between 12
and 14 years of schooling.
Education low: Obtained highest qualification, requires fewer than 12




We use the 1 digit ISCO-68 Occupational Classification for our four-coun-
try comparison of occupations. The reason we follow ISCO-68 instead of
ISCO-88, which is the latest international standard classification of occupa-
tions, is that the occupational classification in HUS does not distinguish be-
tween skilled work and elementary occupation. Because this distinction is
essential in making data correspond to the 1 digit ISCO-88, we can only create
a variable that corresponds to 1 digit ISCO-68 for HUS. GSOEP includes a
Married or cohabiting Single




Married, living together with 
spouse; or Married, living 
permanently separated from 
my spouse, single, divorced or 
widowed; and living with 
partner in same household
Married, living permanently 
separated from my spouse; 
single; divorced; or widowed 




Married; living with partner Divorced (not living with 
partner); widowed (not living 
with partner); single/never 
married
Sweden (HUS) Married; cohabiting Single
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variable of ISCO-68 directly. BHPS and OSA give the classification based on
ISCO-88 and we convert ISCO-88, using “Index of occupational titles accord-
ing to ISCO-88 numerical order” in ILO (1990, pp. 273–334).
Industrial Classification
Industrial classifications are as follows: agriculture (agriculture, forestry,
and fishing), manufacturing and mining, energy (energy and water supply),
construction, shops, restaurants, etc. (wholesale and retail trade/hotels and res-
taurants), transportation (transportation and communications), finance (fi-
nance, insurance, and real estate), and public nonprofit (nonprofit business:
industrial classification in HUS, except we combine manufacturing and mining
industry, and the British Standard Industrial Classification 1980 [SIC] in BHPS
1998 does not provide an independent category for mining). We do not adopt
NACE-European Community Classification of Economic Activities as our in-
dustrial classification because it is impossible to make the corresponding clas-
sification using HUS, which has the roughest industrial classification among
our four data sets.
Note
1. Another comparison across the EU states offered by Fagan and Ward (in this vol-
ume) is the average number of hours per week worked by a part-time working
woman. Sweden and France are the only two countries that have averages of 23
hours per week, whereas part-time women in most EU countries average fewer












Low 0.394 0.632 0.637 0.463 0.490
Medium = base
High 0.450 0.189 0.166 0.240 0.226
Age groups
16–24 0.162 0.064 0.115 0.080 0.036
25–34 0.278 0.313 0.236 0.235 0.179
35–44 = base
45–54 0.196 0.209 0.214 0.278 0.325
55–64 0.093 0.121 0.116 0.100 0.202
Married or cohabiting 0.715 0.751 0.785 0.808 0.858
No children = base
1 child 0.131 0.164 0.186 0.146 0.091
2 or more children 0.138 0.140 0.079 0.201 0.106
Age of youngest child in the 
household
0–2 0.110 0.095 0.049 0.112 0.038
3–5 0.069 0.085 0.054 0.087 0.054
Industry 
Agriculture 0.026 0.027 0.044 0.039 0.024
Energy 0.016 0.022 0.023 0.010 0.026
261
Construction 0.090 0.108 0.227 0.101 0.084
Shops, restaurants, etc. 0.176 0.089 0.100 0.151 0.090
Transportation 0.095 0.087 0.098 0.081 0.091
Finance 0.139 0.056 0.026 0.145 0.104
Public, nonprofit 0.188 0.278 0.222 0.287 0.259
Manufacturing = base
Occupation (ISCO-68)
0/1: Professional 0.190 0.228 0.127 0.300 0.245
2: Administrative 0.140 0.075 0.066 0.107 0.099
3: Clerical 0.103 0.135 0.076 0.107 0.122
4: Sales workers 0.091 0.061 0.067 0.077 0.095
5: Service workers 0.100 0.078 0.075 0.051 0.075
6: Agricultural workers 0.030 0.024 0.040 0.044 0.023
7/8/9: Production 
workers = base
N 2,992 1,351 818 1,266 1,266
See Table 7.1 for the source and Appendix A for a detailed description of variables.







Low 0.466 0.653 0.541 0.391 0.483
High 0.366 0.138 0.156 0.219 0.322
Age groups
16–24 0.181 0.087 0.137 0.121 0.044
25–34 0.271 0.310 0.233 0.275 0.184
45–54 0.215 0.198 0.215 0.240 0.329
55–64 0.076 0.106 0.089 0.060 0.186
Married or cohabiting 0.690 0.723 0.769 0.784 0.846
No. of children in the household
1 child 0.152 0.143 0.170 0.153 0.148
2 or more children 0.130 0.091 0.048 0.182 0.158
Age of youngest child in 
the household
0–2 0.087 0.023 0.009 0.121 0.044
3–5 0.066 0.067 0.036 0.081 0.090
Industry 
Agriculture 0.008 0.015 0.025 0.018 0.009
Energy 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.009
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Construction 0.008 0.006 0.015 0.012 0.006
Shops, restaurants, etc. 0.257 0.201 0.161 0.197 0.091
Transportation 0.036 0.079 0.084 0.043 0.037
Finance 0.134 0.082 0.060 0.114 0.065
Public, nonprofit 0.437 0.485 0.542 0.558 0.667
Occupation (ISCO-68)
0/1: Professional 0.196 0.260 0.305 0.325 0.513
2: Administrative 0.073 0.014 0.025 0.034 0.046
3: Clerical 0.284 0.293 0.286 0.242 0.180
4: Sales workers 0.123 0.166 0.164 0.118 0.077
5: Service workers 0.250 0.169 0.108 0.225 0.093
6: Agricultural workers 0.007 0.018 0.025 0.019 0.006
N 3,007 1,000 688 983 1,120
See Table 7.1 for the source and Appendix A for a detailed description of variables.
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